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Abstract
Prepared for a recent presentation for APEC Member Economies, this paper surveys how 
APEC Member Economies have responded to public-interest-based criticisms in ISDS through 
multilateral negotiations, treaty and investment agreement drafting and administrative 
measures. While no other APEC Member besides Australia has decided to forgo ISDS 
altogether, the language in APEC investment agreements shows clear progress towards 
acceptance of major public interest concerns in recent years. At the same time, there is no sign 
that a consensus is emerging among Members to amend the basic institutional features of ISDS.
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I. Introduction
After a steep rise in the number of investment agreements including 
investor state dispute settlement or “ISDS,” a few APEC Members have 
recently reconsidered including ISDS in their FTAs under mounting 
criticism from national assemblies, environmental, labor, and human rights 
NGOs and even jurists. In April 2011, Australia’s “Gillard Government 
Trade Policy Statement”1) announced that Australia would discontinue the 
practice of including ISDS provisions in its trade treaties. On November 16 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Kyung Hee University School of Law, Seoul, Republic of 
Korea.
1) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gillard Government Trade Policy 
Statement: Trading  our way to more jobs and prosperity,  http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/
trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.html#promotion.
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2011 the President of Korea acknowledged the domestic opposition to ISDS 
by promising the National Assembly that he would renegotiate the ISDS 
provisions of the KORUS-FTA2) if the National Assembly would agree to 
ratify the treaty.3) These events show how a negative impression of ISDS, 
once an obscure topic understood only by arbitrators and law professors, 
has swiftly entered public consciousness. Moreover, several of the most 
complicated and expensive investment arbitration claims have involved 
widespread public opposition to large-scale foreign investment projects for 
natural resource extraction or for water distribution.4)  These cases reflect a 
costly breakdown in relations between the foreign investors and the 
governments and civil society stakeholders of the host country, which can, 
in severe cases, diminish the attractiveness of a host country for investment.
As the costs and frequency of investor state arbitration has risen, critics 
have pressured governments for more accountability through a 
reassessment of the institutional features of investment arbitration to 
promote transparency and to level the playing field for the public sector.5) 
On this occasion of the APEC Capacity Building Workshop on FTA 
Implementation,6) I have been asked to discuss public criticism of ISDS in 
FTAs and to highlight Member best practices and APEC recommendations 
that pertain to the criticisms of ISDS. How are the APEC Member 
Economies currently addressing the public-interest- based objections to 
ISDS? In this paper, I will summarize a few of the most commonly voiced 
criticisms and show how APEC Member Economies have been adapting 
wording in the investment chapters of FTAs. Then I will discuss how 
individual Member Economies have used various strategies to mitigate the 
2) The Free Trade Agreementbetween the United States of America and the Republic of 
Korea U.S.-S. Kor., Apr.2007, renegot. Dec. 3, 2010, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter KORUS-FTA]).
3) “Lee Vows, Renegotiation of Key Clause in US FTA, Korea Times, Nov. 15, 2011, available 
at http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/11/113_98838.html.
4) Cf. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 Award, (June 
2006), Tecnicus Medioambientales Techmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case NO. 
ARB(AF)/00/2 Award, (May 29, 2003).
5) See generally, Gus Van HarTen, inVesTmenT TreaTy arbiTraTion and Public laW, Oxford 
University Press, 2007.
6) APEC Capacity Building Workshop on FTA Implementation, Jeju Island, S. Kor., 
(Nov.16, 2012).
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cost and frequency of investment claims, and to foster better relationships 
between local stakeholders impacted by investment and by including local 
stakeholder arrangements in individual contracts with investors. While no 
other APEC Member besides Australia has decided to forgo ISDS 
altogether, the language in APEC investment agreements, particularly 
FTAs, shows clear momentum towards incorporation of issues of public 
concern. On the other hand, APEC FTA practice as yet reveals no clear 
consensus to amend the fundamental institutional features of ISDS. The 
lack of agreement in APEC parallels the current global divide7) over 
whether investment arbitration should continue under the norms and 
procedures evolved from international commercial arbitration or adopt 
more  judicialized proceedings with a heightened level of state supervision 
appropriate for public law bodies.8)
II.  Core Substantive Provisions in Investment Chapters of 
APEC FTAs
ISDS has been identified by the APEC’s Committee on Trade and 
Investment as one of the core elements of APEC FTAs in a survey on 
existing FTAs9) The investment provisions of APEC FTAs broadly are 
7) For example, the controversy has played out recently in the UNCITRAL Working 
Group on Transparency in Investor State Dispute Resolution. In January 2013 a working 
group agreed to a set of rules making most of the documents and proceedings public which 
would apply to all future investment treaties that refer to the UNCTIRAL Rules unless the 
Contracting Parties to the investment agreement expressly opt out. See Eric Luke Peterson, 
UN Group Finalizes Transparency Rules But They Won’t Automatically Apply to Stockpiles of 
Existing Treaties, inVesTmenT arbiTraTion rePorTer, (Feb. 14, 2013); UNCITRAL, Working 
Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), A/CN.9/765, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration 
and Conciliation) on the work of its fifty-eighth session (New York, Feb. 4-8, 2013), http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html.
8) Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, Investment Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law, 17  eur. J. inT’l l., no. 1, 2006. See also Jason Webb Yackee’s summary of 
theories of investment arbitration as a system of public governance in, Jason Webb Yackee, 
Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HarV. J. inT’l l., no. 2, 395-397, Summer 
2012.
9) APEC Investment Expert’s Group, Identifying Core Elements in Investment Agreements in 
the APEC Region, Dec. 2007, APEC# 207-CT-01.14.
200 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 12: 197
meant to serve three purposes: investment liberalization, investment 
promotion and investment protection.10) The core substantive investment 
protection features of APEC FTAs are the non-discrimination provisions on 
National Treatment (“NT”) and Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”), and the 
provisions for Fair and Equitable Treatment (“FET”), expropriation, 
compensation for loss, transfer of funds and transparency.11) Substantial 
variation exists in the extent of their legal protection afforded by these 
clauses due to differences in wording. As a threshold issue, each 
substantive provision must be read carefully against the definitions of 
investor and investment that provide standing for bringing a claim under 
the treaty in order to determine its scope. 
The investment chapters of APEC FTAs can be classified into two kinds: 
those that cover the pre-establishment phase and those that cover post-
establishment treatment. The distinction is important in investment 
arbitration because conflicts can arise over the framework for screening 
foreign investors and whether an investors’ expectations of a stable 
legislative framework was violated when a regulation changed after 
admission or because they received prior “specific assurances.”12) Treaties 
that specify NT or MFN in the admission or establishment of investments 
cover pre-establishment treatment.13) Two common approaches among 
APEC Members are pre-establishment treatment subject to non-conforming 
measures in a negative list as in the KORUS-FTA14) and pre-establishment 
treatment according to a positive list as in the Thailand-Australia FTA.15) 
APEC recommends that Members accord NT in the establishment phase, 
10) Id. at 31.
11) Id. at 23-31.
12) In Methanex v. United States, the tribunal identifies five conditions for specific 
assurances: 1) that the assurance is given by the regulating government 2) to the foreign 
investor itself, 3) at the time the investor is contemplating making the investment 4) the 
commitment must be specific, and 5) assurance must be given in good faith. Methanex 
Corporation v. United States of America, NAFTA Award, Part IV. Ch D. ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005).
13) Anna Joubin-Bret, Admission and Establishment in International Investment Agreements, 
in ProTecTion of foreiGn inVesTmenT THrouGH modern TreaTy arbiTraTion (2010).
14) Supra note 2.
15) Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Thai.-Austl., art. 903-907, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tafta/tafta_toc.html.
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subject to domestic laws.16)
Member FTAs nearly all state that expropriation is prohibited unless it 
is for a legitimate public purpose and carried out in a non-discriminatory 
manner with prompt and adequate compensation.17) Aside from the direct 
seizure of assets, most investment tribunals today also consider investors’ 
claims regarding indirect expropriations through other government actions, 
including legislation, executive decrees, judicial orders, or administrative 
actions such as denials of a permit, that deprive an investor of the 
substantial value of the investment.18)
APEC has made comprehensive suggestions to its members concerning 
transparency standards. At a minimum, APEC core obligations of 
transparency are to cooperate, to consult, to exchange information and 
notify, to respond to questions, to establish contact points; and to publish 
the designated material (laws).19) The idea of transparency is also extended 
to investor treatment in the host state’s judicial system. Traditionally 
considered part of a fair and equitable treatment claim, many APEC FTAs 
deal with transparency of the legal system in detail in the investment 
chapter or elsewhere in the FTA. The APEC Model Chapter on 
Transparency for FTAs and RTAs spells out in detail standards for due 
process in the host states’ administrative proceedings (Article 8)20) and for 
16) The 1994 APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles state: “With exceptions as 
provided for in domestic laws, regulations and policies, member economies will accord to 
foreign investors in relation to the establishment, expansion, operation and protection of their 
investments, treatment no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic 
investors.” aPec secreTariaT, aPec Guide To THe inVesTmenT reGimes of THe aPec member 
economies, (6th ed. 2007). available at http://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2007/~/
media/F5A13BFFFE284C8994CC9C88CF6D777D.ashx
17) APEC Investment Expert’s Group, Identifying Core Elements in Investment Agreements in 
the APEC Region, Dec. 2007, APEC# 207-CT-01.14, .at 25.
18) Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico Award, ICSID Case No. ( ARB)AF/97/1, (Aug. 30, 2000), ¶ 
103.
19) APEC Investment Experts Group, Transparency in International Investment Agreements, 
APEC#211-CT-01.10, Jan. 2012, at  9.
20) 1. With a view to administering in a consistent, impartial and reasonable manner its 
measures of general application, each Party shall ensure, in its administrative proceedings, 
that: a. wherever possible, persons of the other Party that are directly affected by a proceeding 
are given reasonable notice, in accordance with the procedures provided for in its domestic 
laws and procedures, when a proceeding is initiated, including a description of the nature of 
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review and appeal (Article 9).21)
III. Frequently Contested Features of ISDS
1.  Disincentives to Legislation and Enforcement of Environmental and 
Health Regulations
Critics have pointed to Phillip Morris’ recent investor state arbitrations 
against Uruguay and Australia22) for instituting anti-smoking regulations 
and Vattenfall’s suit against Germany23) for phasing out nuclear energy as 
proof that investment arbitration restricts the police powers of states to 
regulate for the welfare of their citizens. A considerable amount of claims 
the proceeding, the legal basis in accordance with which the proceeding is initiated, and a 
general description of any relevant issues; b. persons of the other Party that are directly 
affected by a proceeding are afforded a reasonable opportunity to present facts and 
arguments in support of their positions prior to any final administrative action, when time, 
the nature of the proceeding, and the public interest permit; c. its procedures are in 
accordance with the domestic law. Article 8, APEC Model Chapter on Transparency for FTAs 
and RTAs
21) 1. Each Party shall establish or maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or 
procedures, for the purpose of the prompt review and, where warranted, correction of 
administrative actions regarding matters covered by this Agreement. Such tribunals shall be 
impartial and independent of the office or authority entrusted with administrative 
enforcement and shall not have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter. Where 
such procedures are not independent from the agency entrusted with the administrative 
decision concerned, the Party shall ensure that the procedures in fact provide for an objective 
and impartial review. 2. Each Party shall ensure that in any such tribunals or procedures the 
parties to the proceedings are provided with: a. a reasonable opportunity to advocate for their 
respective positions; and b. a decision based on the evidence. 3. Subject to appeal or further 
review procedures as provided for in its domestic law, each Party shall ensure such decisions 
shall be implemented by, and shall govern the practice, of the offices or authorities with 
respect to the administrative action at issue. Id. Article 9
22) Philip Morris Brand Sàrl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and 
Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uruguay) v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7; 
Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-12.
23) Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Nuclear Energy GmbH, 
Kernkraftwerk BrunsbüttelGmbH und Co. oHG, Kernkraftwerk Krümmel GmbH und Co. 
oHG v. Federal Republic of Germany.
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have included challenges environmental regulation, and some public 
health regulations as violations of fair and equitable treatment provisions 
or indirect expropriations.24) When new health dangers are discovered, 
States will be forced to bear the commercial risk on behalf of companies in 
order to take steps necessary to protect their public, critics argue.25) States 
will prefer not to exercise preventative measures that might delay 
investment projects, such as environmental impact statements, because of 
fear of legal retaliation for lost profits, creating a chilling effect on 
environmental and health regulation, they say.26)
2. Criticisms of Institutional Features
Three institutional features of ISDS in particular have attracted negative 
attention: the possibility of conflict of interest among arbitrators, the lack of 
review of awards, and the lack of openness of the proceedings.27)
1) Conflicts of Interest
Opponents of ICSD say that the tribunals are composed of primarily of 
lawyers from large law firms who rely on multinational firms for their 
business, resulting in a process skewed in favor of investors.28) An OECD 
recent report cites a study finding that over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have 
acted as counsel for investors in other ISDS cases while it has been 
estimated about 10% of ISDS arbitrators have acted as counsel for States in 
24) For a list of environmental disputes decided in investment arbitration from 2000-2011, 
see Jorge Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law, cambridGe, 2009 
at 18-22.
25) See generally, Valentin Vadi, Public Health in International Investment Arbitration, 
rouTledGe, 2013.
26) Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, et al. Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, 
KluWer laW, 2011, at 121.
27) UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Disputes Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, iia issues 
noTe  (May 2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf; 
Fiona Marshall, Defining New Institutional Options for Investor State Dispute Settlement, insTiTuTe 
for inTernaTional deVeloPmenT, June 2009.
28) Nathalie Bersconi-Osterwalder, et. al, Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality: 
Examining the Dual Role of Arbitrator and Counsel, presented at the Annual Forum for 
Developing Country Investment Negotiators, New Dehli, 2010.
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other cases.29) It has been suggested that arbitrators have a structural 
conflict of interest in deciding on whether they have jurisdiction to hear 
each ISDS dispute because they are in effect deciding whether they will 
continue to be active (and be paid) for substantial additional work on the 
case in question.30) In addition to its economic impact in the case at hand, 
expansive rulings on jurisdiction may contribute to expanding the scope of 
ISDS arbitral business in the future.31) The rules for disclosure of conflict of 
interest are much less demanding than for national judicial systems and 
under national arbitration laws. While NAFTA Chapters 19 and 20 for 
state-to-state arbitrations list the situations in which arbitrators must 
disclose their relationships to the parties,32) the author is not aware of 
parallel stipulations for investment in any ratified treaty.33) In ICSID 
arbitration, before or at the first session of the tribunal, each arbitrator is 
required to fill and sign a disclosure declaration, but there are no rules as to 
what conflicts of interests must be disclosed.34)
2) Inconsistency of Outcomes
Critics of ISDS say the lack of appellate review in investment arbitration 
leads to inconsistent and unfair outcomes. Indeed in several cases separate 
arbitrations have led to the opposite outcome on the same government 
measure. And it is not uncommon for different tribunals to disagree about 
the meaning of the same treaty provision. The dense universe of investment 
29) OECD Secretariat, Public Consultation on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Scoping Paper, 
2012, http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/internationalinvestmentagreements/ 
50291642.pdf, at  42-48.
30) Id.
31) Id.
32) NAFTA Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures under Chapter 19 and 
20, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=658&mtpiID=ALL.
33) The European Commission’s recent proposal for investor state dispute settlement 
addresses the arbitrator conflict of interest comprehensively in an annex. European 
Commission, Note for the Attention of the Trade Policy Committee of the European Council (Services 
and Investment): Text on investor state dispute settlement for EU agreements, 5-6-2012. See also 
www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/analysis-of-the-european-commissions-draft-text-on-investor-
state-dispute-settlement-for-eu-agreements.
34) ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 6, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
ICSID/RulesMain.jsp.
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treaties has created incoherent and fragmented states of international 
investment law35) creating an environmental of legal uncertainty that can 
lead to abuse of the legal system.36) Appellate review is necessary for good 
governance,37) some argue.
Instead of appellate review, the ICSID Convention provides for an 
internal review procedure.38) An ad hoc Tribunal will be established to 
review whether one of five circumstances were present to invalidate the 
award.39) Errors of law are not grounds for annulment, even if manifestly 
unwarranted.40) Annulment does not preclude the parties from making the 
same claims in another arbitration. ICISD Arbitral awards are annulled less 
frequently than they are upheld. 41)
It must be remembered that different investment tribunals are often 
faced with interpreting the same wording which may have different 
intended meanings in the context of different treaties, making a universal 
appellate review mechanism practically impossible at this point.42) The 
35) Stephen Schill, The Multilateralization of Investment Law, cambridGe uniVersiTy Press, 
2009.
36) David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State 
Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 Vand. J. TransnaT’l l.  39, 74 (2006).
37) For an argument that an appellate mechanism would enhance both the consistency 
and legitimacy of investor arbitration, see Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 
fordHam l. reV. 1521 (2005).
38) Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270. .
39) The conditions under Art. 52 are a) That the Tribunal was not properly constituted; b) 
that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; c) that there was corruption on the part 
of a member of the Tribunal, that there has been as serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure; or e) that the award has filed to state the reasons on which it is based. See id.
40) “Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be distinguished from erroneous 
application of those rules which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no ground for 
annulment.” See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Annulment Decision, ICSID, Case 
No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 50 (Sept. 25, 2007).
41) Between 2001 and 2010 13 out of 21 applications for annulment were rejected. ICSID, 
ICSID Caseload Statistics for 2011-2, at 15.
42) The tribunal in the OSPAR convention noted the conundrum in a different context. 
“The application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar 
provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia, 
differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and 
travaux preparatoires.” See Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the 
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difficulty with coherence has been ameliorated to some extent by treaties 
that provide a procedure for requesting interpretive notes from the States 
through Joint Commissions.43)
3) Confidentiality of Proceedings
It is often argued that unlike international commercial arbitration, 
investor state dispute settlement should be fully open to the public because 
of the significant public interests involved. The public interest is implicated 
in ISDS because a) ISDS often involves public service sectors; b) 
Government regulation enacted for public welfare purposes may be the 
subject of the dispute; c) The presence of a government in the arbitration 
triggers good governance obligations; d) The costs of defending claims and 
financing compensation awards will draw on public funds; e) The threat of 
arbitration from an investor can have a ‘chilling’ effect on government 
policy and prevent the raising of environmental standards, health and 
safety standards, and labour conditions.44) 
Unlike national court systems and public international law tribunals, 
however, the proceedings of investor state arbitrations are not made public 
in accordance with a general duty of confidentiality owed by the tribunal 
subject to the agreement of the parties.45) Most treaties allow a choice for 
arbitration rules from among ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration rules, less 
frequently including Permanent Court of Arbitration or International 
Chamber of Commerce or other institutional arbitration, each carrying with 
it different rules for the confidentiality of proceedings. The ICSID Center 
administering ICSID arbitrations is mandated to maintain a register of 
petitions and notices of the proceedings and to publish excerpts of the legal 
OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. U.K.), Perm. Ct. Arb. ¶ 141 (final award of  July 2, 2003). .
43) The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), a body of cabinet level officials from each 
of NAFTA’s signatories established under the treaty, is authorized to issue interpretations 
binding on tribunals established under NAFTA’s investment chapter, North American Free 
Trade Agreement, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993) Arts. 1131(2), 2001(1) &( 2)(c).
44) See Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment–Environment Disputes: Recent 
Developments, reV.eur. communiTy & inT’l. enVil. l., 230, 16(2) (2007).
45) As an exception, beginning with Annex 1137.4 of NAFTA, which permits either party 
to publish the award when the parties are the United States or Canada, US treaties have 
generally contained provisions on the transparency of arbitral procedures. See US Model BIT, 
Art. 29, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm.
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reasoning of awards.46) On the other hand the ICSID Center is forbidden 
from publishing the full award without the consent of both parties. And the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that persons other than the parties, their 
agents, counsel and advocates, and of witnesses and experts may not be 
allowed to attend hearings without the consent of both parties.47) The 
UNCITRAL Rules for all treaties prior to January 2013, had similar 
limitations except that Article 34(5) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
provided that “[a]n award may be made public with the consent of all 
parties or where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal 
duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to legal proceedings 
before a court or other competent authority.”48) 
3. Risk of Expensive Litigation Against the Public Sector
Another criticism of ISDS is that it exposes the public sector to the risk 
of expensive litigation. Moreover, when the respondent is a developing 
country, as in a large majority of the cases, ISDS can carry a trade off for 
human development, as the money earmarked for awards could be used to 
build schools, roads or hospitals. There is no doubt that the risk of facing an 
investment arbitration is escalating. A steep upward trend has prevailed 
since the year 2000.49) According to UNCTADs, most recent update on 
investor state arbitration cases against APEC members account for 102 of 
the 450 known ISDS cases.50) It should be noted, however, that so far the 
vast majority of these cases are based on bilateral investment treaties (63%) 
or investment contracts (21%) and not free trade agreements.51) 
46) ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 34, Rule 48(4).
47) Id.
48) United National Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (as revised in 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf. Under the recently drafted Rules 
on Transparency in Investor State Dispute Resolution, the notice of arbitration and other key 
documents would be published through the ICSID registry. See supra note 7.
49) UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, April 2012, http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf, at 3.
50) Id. at 15-18.
51) ICSID Caseload Statistics for 2011-12, http://icsid.worldbank.org, at 10.
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In terms of overall costs, expenses for defending ISD cases can range 
from a few hundred thousand to hundreds of million dollars or even 
billions of dollars. Eighty percent of the costs account for attorneys fees.52) 
ISDS cases are longer than WTO cases – averaging three years, with 
annulment petitions lasting another three years.53) A third-party financing 
market has emerged, which critics say contributes to the demand for more 
litigation.54)
As treaties with ISDS multiply, the potential for forum and treaty 
shopping increases. Investors can treaty shop when treaties contain a 
definition of investor with standing that includes subsidiaries of national 
entities wherever located.55) To compensate for this, most recent APEC 
FTAs require incorporation in the participating State and a controlling 
interest in the participating State for investor standing or otherwise contain 
a “denial of benefits” clause.56) Investors have engaged in several attempts 
to forum-shop by taking advantage of the more favorable dispute 
settlement offered to investors of other countries through the MFN clause.57) 
Some Members have therefore expressly exempted dispute resolution from 
the scope of the MFN clause.58)
IV. Responses of the Member Economies
Although APEC publishes no model investment arbitration agreement, 
it has worked for decades through the Investment Expert Group to develop 
non-binding principles59) and other recommendations to guide policy 
52) Supra note 29, at 18-22.
53) Id.
54) Id. at 36-39.
55) Peter Mulchinski, Corporations and Uses of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a 
“Multilateral Legal Order, 1 oñaTi socio-leGal series 4 (2011).
56) Supra note 2, art.11.11.
57) See Emanuel Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction through a Most-Favored Nation Clause, 2 
N.Y.L.J. 1,3. (2005).
58) Canada-Peru FTA Annex B.4, available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/peru-perou/peru-toc-perou-tdm.aspx.
59) The most recent version of the project begun in 1994 may be found at http://aimp.
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makers. Most recently APEC collaborated with UNCTAD to create a 
handbook to serve as an analytical guide for negotiators for investment 
agreements, with a menu of textual options based on common alternative 
approaches.60)  
1. Bilateral and Multilateral Responses 
1) Clarifications and Exceptions to Disciplines
In the wake of the initial ISD cases challenging regulation in the 
environmental area, Member Economies, led by the US, have amended 
their treaties to reserve more policy space, particularly in clauses clarifying 
the scope of expropriations and through the use of expanded exceptions.61) 
A recent OECD study on the treatment of environmental concerns in 
international investment agreements shows that only 8% of all investment 
agreements in existence contain a reference to the environment, while about 
89% of treaties coming into existence contain reference to the 
environment.62) Beginning with the 2004 US Model BIT, the expropriation 
provisions have been modified to allow for the normal exercise of state 
police powers in most cases, clarifying that “Except in rare circumstances, 
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.”63) What rises to the level of expropriation must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration several 
factors, including the extent to which the action “interferes with the 
apec.org/Documents/2011/MM/AMM/11_amm_014app04.doc.
60) APEC, APEC UNCTAD Handbook for Negotiators of International Investment Agreements, 
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Views/Public/Document.aspx?sid=5 . 
APEC explains that it does “not aim to present any sort of consensus or international 
benchmarking,” and that the options are merely “indicative and could be considered by the 
negotiators as a useful element without prejudging national policy decisions.” The handbook 
contains language from treaties inside and outside of APEC.
61) See generally, Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Environmental Concerns in International 
Investment Agreements: a survey, www.oecd.org/daf/investment/workingpapers at 16-22.
62) Id.
63) Supra note 2, art. 11.6.
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investors’ distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations.”64)
Although in general Bilateral Investment Treaties in the region have 
not65) contained general exceptions clauses such as GATT Art. XX to carve 
out regulatory space,66) a few recent APEC investment agreements have 
followed the approach of the Argentina-New Zealand BIT.67) More often, 
Members have used exclusion with regard to specific commitments, such as 
the environmental exception to the prohibition on performance 
requirements in the KORUS-FTA or with respect to mode 3 services 
investment. 68) Korea, for example, has incorporated the exceptions clause of 
GATS Art. XIV(b)69) into service sector commitments, but not for the 
Agreement overall, in its FTAs with Singapore and Peru and in the 
64) Id.
65) Many earlier BITs of the US have included a less inclusive “Non-Precluded Measures” 
(NPM) clause for measures concerning vital public interest in emergency situations See 
William Burke White & Andreas Von Stadten, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 Va. J. 
inT’l l. 307(2007)
66) One notable exception is the very wide exclusion in the Korea-Japan BIT Art. 16(1)(c), 
“Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement <….> each Contracting Party <…> 
take any measure necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” available at 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/korea_japan.pdf. See also, the Korean 
ASEAN Investment Agreement Art. 20, available at http://akfta.asean.org/index.
php?page=investment-legal-text.
67) Art. 5(3) states: “The provisions of this Agreement shall in no way limit the right of 
either Contracting Party to take any measures (including the destruction of plants and 
animals, confiscation of property or the imposition of restrictions on stock movement) 
necessary for the protection of natural and physical resources or human health, provided such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustified discrimination,” available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
argentina_newzealand.pdf. See also the KOREA-ASEAN FTA Investment Agreement, Art. 
20(1).
68) Supra note 2, art. 11.8(3)(c), “Notwithstanding any other provisions in this Agreement 
<….> each Contracting Party <…> take any measure necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health.”
69) “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of 
measures… (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;” Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in 
Services and Annexes, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 1994.
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KOREA-ASEAN FTA.70) Under the influence of such clarifications and 
exceptions, investment arbitration tribunals today may be moving toward 
perform balancing and proportionality tests when applying expropriation 
or fair and equitable treatment clauses in contrast to the more absolute 
approach of the early cases.71) 
2) Sustainability Impact Assessments
Aside from changes in treaty drafting, some members have employed 
Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (hereinafter ‘SIA’) to engage a 
variety of stakeholders to induce “buy in” for investment liberalization, 
particularly when in agreements with the EU.72) Trade SIA is a process 
undertaken during a trade negotiation which seeks to identify the potential 
economic, social and environmental impacts of a trade agreement. Trade 
SIAs aim to integrate sustainability into trade policy by informing 
negotiators of the possible social, environmental and economic 
consequences of a trade agreement and to make information on the 
potential impacts available to all actors.73) SIAs have attempted to engage a 
wide spectrum of interest groups on consultations about the impact of the 
investment agreement. 74) There are particular problems with evaluating the 
impact of investment chapters since so much depends on the conduct and 
business plans of the investor that is ultimately approved, but this only 
underscores the necessity of conducting rigorous due diligence on 
individual investors through published project-based social and 
environmental impact statements.
70) Korea Singapore FTA art. 21.2.(2)(c), available at http://www.commonlii.org/sg/
other/treaties/2005/2/, and Korea Peru FTA art. 24.1 (2), available at http://www.sice.oas.
org/TPD/PER_KOR/PER_KOR_Texts_e/PER_KOR_ToC_e.asp
71) Gordon, supra note 61, at 10.
72) See, for example the Korea-EU FTA Sustainability Impact Assessment, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141660.pdf. See also Colin 
Kirkpatrick et al., The Trade sustainability impact assessment (SIA) on the comprehensive economic 
and trade agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada: Final report, euroPean commission Trade 
assessmenTs, (2012) available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28812/.
73) European Commission, Handbook for Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments, 2006, at 7.
74) Id. at 23.
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3) Transparency Provisions
Member Economies have also strengthened transparency provisions in 
recent treaties along many dimensions. Concerning ISDS procedures, a 
growing minority of the treaties in existence today follow an open 
approach using the wording of the 2004 Model US BIT requiring public 
hearings and public access to all the documents such as the notifications, 
pleadings, final award, allowing for non-disputing party, and amicus curiae 
submissions. If a party requests confidentiality on a particular matter for 
business reasons or because it is privileged under domestic law, the 
tribunal is mandated to arrange for confidentiality. 75)
Foreign investment projects with unrealistic or inflated financial 
projections have been associated with corruption in the admission process, 
leading to conflicts with governments and the public.76) A few FTAs include 
clauses that foster good governance by focusing on the elimination of 
bribery through anti-corruption legislation, such as Article 21.6 in the 
KORUS-FTA transparency chapter.77)  
4) Negotiating for an Appellate Review Mechanism
There have been three distinct approaches to address the demand for an 
appellate review mechanism. First, a single consolidated appeals facility 
could be created under the ICSID convention. This has been apparently 
been a US policy objective, thus the US 2012 Model BIT states, “In the event 
that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-
75) US Model BIT art. 29, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
117601.pdf.
76) The Dabhol Power Project in India was one such example, involving the failed US 
multinational Enron. See Gus Van Harten, TWAIL and the Dabhol Arbitration,, Trade, laW and 
deVeloPmenT (2011). Arbitration claims were launched under investment contracts and a 
bilateral investment treaty
77) 1. The Parties reaffirm their resolve to eliminate bribery and corruption in 
international trade and investment. 
2. Each Party shall adopt or maintain the necessary legislative or other measures to 
establish that it is a criminal offense under its law, in matters affecting international trade or 
investment, for: 
(a) a public official of the Party or a person who performs public functions for the Party 
intentionally to solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any article of monetary value or other 
benefit, such as a favor, promise, or advantage, for himself or for another person, in exchange 
for any act or omission in the performance of his public functions;. .. supra note 2.
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State dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the future under other 
institutional arrangements, the Parties shall consider whether awards 
rendered under Article 34 should be subject to that appellate mechanism.” 
The introduction of an appeals facility at ICSID would mean amending Art. 
54 of the ICSID Convention guaranteeing the finality of the awards, which 
would require the agreement of 143 States. Alternatively, specific states 
could agree to a protocol to the ICSID convention. In 2004, the ICSID 
Secretariat released a “Discussion Paper on Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration” with a detailed proposal in the Annex 
for an appeals facility. The Secretariat abandoned the idea in view of the 
difficult technical and policy issues raised.78)  
A second approach has been to negotiate appeals mechanism for 
individual treaties.  Thus CAFTA79) and the KORUS-FTA contain 
obligations to establish a negotiating group to develop an appellate body or 
similar mechanism linked to the treaty. However, if such appellate 
mechanisms came into existence, arguably they might worsen the problem 
of inconsistency and fragmentation in international investment law while 
increasing the length of proceedings. Under this reasoning, it would be 
better to wait for an appeals facility associated with a single multilateral 
investment treaty, which is the third approach. Currently the Transpacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement with eleven countries is one of a 
few multilateral investment agreement negotiations in the region with 
investor state dispute settlement at the moment, 80) including Member 
Economies Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, the United 
States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, and Canada. Another is 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership which includes China 
78) International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Secretariat, Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discussion Paper (Oct. 22, 2004), available 
at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&acti
onVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf.
79) United States-Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Annex 
10-F, , available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text.
80) The main agreement is available at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-
agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf. The investment chapter, which was leaked 
unofficially outside of negotiations, can be found at http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/
wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment.pdf.
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but not the United States.81)
2.  Pre-arbitration Strategies for Conflict Prevention by Individual 
Member Economies
1) Pre-establishment Treatment
In investment arbitration, since the actions of all the various agencies 
interacting with foreign investors are judged as a whole some Members 
have focused on interagency coordination to prevent disputes from 
occurring. The commitment of protection of the investors legitimate 
expectations necessarily takes into account all representations and 
undertakings made by the host state including those in legislation, treaties, 
decrees, licenses, and contracts. Unless the treaty specifies otherwise, 
conduct of a local government or other entity exercising government of 
authority will be attributed to the national government under international 
law.82) When drafting environmental and health legislation, the investment 
treaty commitments should always be taken into account.  Tribunals will be 
more likely to recognize a public health or environmental exception closely 
linked to the implementation of an international environmental treaty or if 
it is backed up by a favorable cost-benefit analysis or proportionality 
analysis to support an argument of reasonableness.83)
Besides communicating with relevant agencies involved with foreign 
investments about investment treaty commitments, some Member 
Economics have created a central contact point to coordinate negotiations 
with aggrieved foreign investors and have designated an entity that has 
legal authority to represent the Member in settlement negotiations.84) 
Members have established formal, reconciliation institutions, such as 
conciliation or arbitration-mediation services85) and foreign investment 
81) See Asian Leaders Push Regional Trade Pact, Wall sT. J. , Nov. 19, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323622904578128650479355368.html.
82) Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentian (Vivendi Annulment), ICSID 
Case No. ARB.97/3 (July. 3, 2002), 19 ICSID Rev. 89 (2004).
83) Vinuales, supra note 24, at. 275-277, 313-314.
84) UNCTAD, Investor State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, at 88-93.
85) See, for example, International Bar Association et al., The IBA Rules for Investor State 
Mediation,, available athttp://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Mediation/
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ombudsman. An ombud has been defined as an “officer appointed by the 
legislature to handle complaints against administrative and judicial action,” 
serving as a “watchdog” over those actions while exercising independence, 
expertise, impartiality, accessibility and powers of persuasion rather than 
control.” In some cases, the Ombudsman office has been able to alert 
Member economies to emerging conflicts, as well as serve as a mediator 
between investors and the government agencies with which investors have 
grievances. Korea has had an Investment Ombudsman Office since 1998 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister’s Office. Its Investment Aftercare 
team both assists companies in understanding and complying with 
regulations and resolves disputes. From 2000 to 2007, more than 3,200 
grievances of foreign investors that were received by the OIO covered an 
array of issues pertaining to various industrial sectors. In 2007, 370 
grievances were filed, of which 298 were resolved by the “home doctors,” 
constituting 80.5 per cent of all grievances in that year.86)
2) Contractual Approaches
Some Member economies have found innovative ways to accommodate 
the interests of local non-government stakeholders in individual contracts 
with investors. Such provisions are aimed at providing additional security 
to local populations most strongly affected by an investment project. Local 
populations can be given a role in monitoring environmental or health 
compliance as can be seen in the agreement between Canada, government 
of the Northwest Territories, and BHP Diamonds.87) When people are 
displaced physically by an investment project, the contracts may preserve 
the right to limited use of the land, or grant other means of economic 
compensation through the investment project, such as equity stakes. As 
another example, access and benefit sharing agreements grant foreign 
investors the right to bioprospect in return for some sort of benefits to 
State_Mediation/Default.aspx.
86) Supra note 85. 
87) Article VII of the Environmental Agreement between Her Majesty the Queen in Right 
of Canada as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and 
the Government of the Northwest Territories and BHP Diamonds, Inc., available at http://
www.monitoringagency.net/ResourceCentre/EnvironmentalAgreement/tabid/87/Default.
aspx.
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indigenous populations, including a right to royalties from the drugs 
developed on the basis of samples obtained.88) Australia has drafted 
templates of such agreements; these and other model agreements are 
available from the World Intellectual Property Organization.89)
3. Approaches from Outside APEC
It is worthwhile for the APEC Members to consider some novel 
developments outside the region in incorporating the public interest. 
Although FTAs do not yet impose duties on investors as well as States, 
some agreements come very close. The EU-CARIFORUM Economic 
Partnership Agreement (2008) imposes an obligation on the participating 
States to ensure that investors do not commit bribery and that investors 
comply with International Labor Organization Standards, environmental 
and labor treaties to which the states are parties.90) Furthermore, the 
Contracting parties must insure that investors will establish community 
liaison processes in connection natural resource projects.91) 
V. Conclusion
The ISD clauses of international investment treaties have attracted 
national controversy in several of the Member Economies, prompting a 
reconsideration of treaty drafting and the adoption of pre-litigation 
strategies to increase communication between investors and host-country 
stakeholders in order to prevent or resolve disputes at an early stage. 
Concerning the objection that ISD infringes on the sovereign right of States 
88) Guidelines and model contractual clauses are presented in the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the convention on Biological Diversity, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/
text.
89) WIPO’s database of contracts is available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/databases/
contracts.
90) EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement art.71, Council Decision 
2008/805/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 51. 
91) Id.
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to legislate for environmental health and welfare, Member Economies have 
mostly chosen to negotiate to carve out public policy exceptions to the 
pertinent investment disciplines, but seldom with the full breadth of the 
WTO GATT and GATS exceptions clause. Some recent APEC FTAs have 
followed the US approach of incorporating provisions on the transparency 
of investment arbitral proceedings in their treaties. While considerable 
harmonization in the wording of investment disciplines and ISD clauses 
appears to be taking place, the APEC Members have neither the unified 
approach to the question of an appellate mechanism to support consistency 
of outcomes, nor has the problem of conflict of interest among arbitrators 
been addressed in any substantive way in the treaties. This suggests that 
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